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Moral Issues in Medical Experimentation on Humans 
by 
Carl Cohen 
Experimentation on human subjects creates moral problems of some 
complexity. The great frequency of such experimentation, its importance, and its 
unavoidability press us to resolve these problems. 
Thousands of medical experiments on humans are in progress at any given time; 
in most of these the risks to the subjects is slight, but in some it is substantial. Upon 
the outcomes of such experiments rest the hopes for advancement in medicine; the 
future well-being of very many humans beings is affected, therefore, by presently 
imposed moral restraints upon experimentation. Experiments upon human subjects 
will not cease in any case. So long as there continue to be any advances in medical 
science, the results of research will be put to use on some human beings, 
somewhere, for the first time. Those will be experiments. The issue, therefore, is 
not whether we should permit such experiments -- they will certainly continue so 
long as medicine is not frozen in its tracks -- but what principles rightly guide such 
experiments, and what restraints are rightly placed upon them. 
My aim in. what follows is mainifold. I shall explain some of these principles and 
constraints, in some cases defending, in some cases merely explicating, and in some 
cases exhibiting the tension between competing alternative views. The terrain I 
explore is extensive and boggy; I will achieve my principal purpose if I succeed in 
mapping its major features, gWing a reasonably clear view of the whole, and 
identifying those sub.t.enitories needing further reflective attention. 
I shall be concerned chiefly with medical experiments; the testing of a new drug 
for a known disease may be taken as a paradigm case, But all that I shall say will 
bear, with appropriate adjustments, upon experiments pursued for any honorable 
purpose if the subjects are human beings. Whatever the sphere of experiment, the 
judgment of the justifiability of the risks run will require some technical knowledge 
of what is afoot. Yet the question of justifiability is not strictly a technical question 
at all. It lies in that special domain of moral issues that can be resolved--and indeed 
that can often be well formulated-·only in empirical contexts well-understood. The 
task is essentially philosophical; yet without the cooperation of experimentalists 
any moral principles developed will have little concrete anchorage. 
I divide my ent.erprise into four chapters. The first will be concerned with the 
foundations of the principle of consent. The second will undertake an explication 
of the principle of consent, and hence of the absolute protections to which 
potential experimental subjects are entitled. The third will be concerned with the 
task of determining whether (assuming consent obtained or obtainable) the 
experiment itself ought to be forbidden. The fourth will be concerned with three 
particularly delicate controversies that arise in connection with human subject use. 
I yvill conclude with a brief addendum on the problem of applying what.ever 
principles emerge. 
CHAPTER I :  FOUNDATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENT 
It is now nearly universally agreed that the fully informed consent of every 
human subject is properly a precondition of all medical experiments in which such 
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subjects.are to be used. This principle has been proclaimed clearly in the Nuremberg 
Code, and adopted by the World Health Organization in the Declaration of 
Helsinki. What it entails I will examine below, but in a general sense everyone can 
understand and is likely to accept the principle. Human beings whom we seek to 
use as subjects ought to be asked first, and they ought not be so used if they do not 
gi ve their consent freely. That seems a minimal demand of fairness. 
But why'? What larger moral convictions .lie be!hind this principle? Since there is 
general agreement on the need for consent, this might be thought a needlessly 
theoretical question, if an interesting one. In fact, the answer becomes important 
when, as we shall soon see, the detailed content of ·�consent" becomes an issue. At 
that point the deeper grounds for the principle--if we can decide upon them--may 
help us to determine its content more precisely. What the concept means, 
operationally, depends in some degree on what the theories.in which it is embedded 
seek to establish. 
Three major alternative moral grounds for the principle of consent might be 
propos�d. The first is strictly utilitarian. On this view it is simply the maximization 
of benefits to all--long-term and short-term-· that justifies the demand. If consent is 
not required it will often not be sought; if it is not sought, risks may at time be 
imposed upon subjects without their knowledge in ways that may subsequently 
cause great distress or controversy. The reports of such distress will make potential 
subjects, and many hospital patients, very suspicious of medical research, and may 
create a general atmosphere of distrust around medical investigation that will 
redound to the long-term disadvantage both of the research and of its potential 
beneficiaries. The need to obtain the consent of subjectS will cause some researchers 
to refrain from undertaking unduly risky experiments which might have gone 
forward if that need had not been recognized. Moreover, the research itself benefits 
directly from the principle, since the assurance that consent has been given by 
subjects maximizes the likelihood of cooperation between subject and investigator, 
minimizes the likelihood of deliberate or negligent interference, by the subject, in 
the experimental process of which he is a participating element. In a host _of ways, 
this argument concludes, the princple of consent is justified by purely utilitarian 
considerations. 
Although appealing, this analysis leave� one unsatisfied. When the benefits to the 
subject are small or nil, but the risks run by them so great as to make their consent 
unlikely, it may yet be argued that a utilitarian analysis would justify the deceptive 
or forcib�e use .of some subjects--if the long-term advantage to humanity were 
thought sufficiently . great. Yet we all sense that such use.-even if generally 
beneficial--would not be fair. Further, even if we were to agree that the calculation 
of benefits justifies the risks of the experimental procedure in a gen�ral way, the 
utilitatjan approach may fail to distinguish the appropriate pool of subjects, or the 
appropriate distribution of risks among that pool. Not the calculation of benefits 
alone is before our minds when such matters are to be decided. f 
Of course utilitarian considerations may wisely enter in the application of the 
principle of consent, and will do so. But as its ground, two non-utilitarian moral 
approaches are more plausible. They are as follows. 
Every potential subject may be viewed as having certain rights to the control and 
use of his or her own body. Using that body without the consent of the person 
whose body it is would be a violation of that person's right. The principle of 
conseht insums that rights are not so violated. When the subject gives informed 
consent he waives, in effect, his right to exclude the researcher's invasion of his 
person. Because that waiver is an absolute prerequisite of the use of his person, the 
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principle that the consent'of the subject must be obtained is an absolute one. 
An alternative non-utilitarian account goes like this. Every human being, by 
virtue of his or her humanity, is an end, a locu� of intrinsic personal value that 
cannot justly be treated as though it were not different from a dead tool. HU!man 
beings, Immanuel Kant taught, must never be treated as means merely, but always 
also as ends. This imperative is categorical; that is, it applies absolutely and 
universally whatever purpo� we may have in view. It does not forbid the use of 
humans as means. It does forbid any use of them without their playing a role in the 
decision--a role to which they are entitled simply because they are human and are 
therefore members of the community of moral agents. Respect for this 
membership, when experimentation is the aim, requires the consent of the subject. 
Between these two accounts I do not choose here� Both need to be spelled out in 
greater detail, and both have some difficulties. The categorical imperative, although 
very attractive, suffers notoriously from a formal quality that renders difficult the 
giving of empirical content to it in application. The supposition of rights possessed 
by each human over his person also encounters difficulties in application, and raises 
.questions of moral epistemology that have perennially troubled philosophers. 
Recognizing these difficulties, it would still seem that on some such f9undation (or 
both of these if the two prove consistent) the principles of consent is most solidly 
and most appropriately grounded. 
CHAPTER II: EXPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENT 
Assume the principle of consent granted, and grounded in some rational way. 
What does the principle entail? Haw shall it be cashed in practice? 
I argue that the principle has, in fact, three component elem�nts, each of which 
is absolutely essential. The first of these is· information; the consent of the subject 
must be fully informed. The second is competence; the subject must be capable of 
giving consent in that situation. The third is voluntariness; the consent of the 
subject must be given freely, without duress or coercion . I look more closely at 
each of these elements. 
(1) Informed consent. If one has not bt!t!n told, or has been told falsely, what it 
is that may happen to him in a given experiment, he can hardly be said to have 
given consent to what does happeff to him. So critical is this knowledge element 
that, in medical parlance, the principle in question has widely come to be called! the 
principle of "informed consent." This phrase is infelicitous only because it 
emphasizes information so greatly as to obscure the role of the other two elements. 
If all three are to be attended to, the term "full consent" is preferable to "informed 
consent"--or better yet we mny say, simply and rightly, "consent." 
Whatever the term chosen , however, it must be clear that much more than a 
formality or a signature is involved. For his or her full consent the potential subject 
must indeed be informed. But of what? What must we tell him? What must he 
understand? It is obvious that his understanding of the experiment, its aim and Its 
details, will inevitably be very far from co�plete. To require digested informatiqn 
at a level approaching that of the medical scientist himself is evidently absurd, But 
neither must we condescend. The general rule, easier to formulate than to apply, is 
this: we must give the potential subject information adequate, in content and form, 
for a reasonable person to make rationally the decision he is called upon to make: 
whether to participate as subject or not. 
This general statement can be given a good deal more specificity. The subject 
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must be given the information any rational agent would need, information that 
would answer questions of the following kinds: 
(a) What is the general.purpose of the experiment? Full consent to participation 
supposes that the larger objectives of the enterprise are known. Those objectives 
can and must be clearly conveyed. 
(b) 'What must the subject expect to happen to him, in the course of the 
experiment, as a result of his participation? What procedures will he be involved in,. 
what drugs or injections wm he be given, what tests made, etc.? 
( c) What risks, if any, does the subject run? What adverse side-eff�c.ts may be 
anticipated, or feared, and with what degree of probability? What discomforts or 
temporary disabilities are likely to ensue as a result of participation? 
(d) What benefits, if any, may the subject anticipate, or hope for, with what 
degree of probability? 
(e) Does participation in the experiment involve, for.the patient who is sick, any 
.changes from the normal treatment of his condition? If so, what are the �ifferences 
in treatment being agreed to, and what are their likely consequences, to the best ·of 
present knowledge? . 
(f) Who is paying to support tliis research? What costs, if any, may be Imposed 
upon the subject? 
(g) May the subject withdraw from participation, or decline to participate. in the 
first instance'? All potential subjects have the right to withdraw or decline--a 
coronary of the principle of consent itself; their possession of that entitlement is 
something of which t}Jey must also be informed, lest it be inferred by them that 
some duress to give consent is being applied. 
Because potential subjects are often patients themselves, and because their 
relations with doctors and other health care personnel are likely to be 
anxiety�creating, all needed information in the categories above should (save where 
the risks are utterly trivial!) be conveyed in writing, so that the subject has an 
opportunity to make a deliberative choic�. And the written account of the 
procedures, risks, benefits, and so on, must be in language clear enough for the 
ordinary subject to comprehend. 
In sum, consent is informed when the potential subject is given fµll opportunity 
to know what an ordinary person would have to know to make a rational choice 
about whether to serve as subject or to refrain from doing so. 
Informing the subject entails the clear and adequate provision of the facts. The 
subject should have opportunity to raise questions about the facts important to 
him, and is entitled to answers as full as accurate as the investigator's knowledge 
permits. Help in understanding what is needful is what is required. But informing 
the potential subject does not entail being certain that the person has, in fact, 
mastered the information provided, that he does remember and does comprehend 
all that has been provided. That some persons will not attend to or recall 
information essential for rational choice is a fact investigators inay know,. and may 
seek to overcome. The 0potential subject must be treated fairly; it is not part of that 
fairness that the subject's own steady rationality be guaranteed. 
(2) Competent consent. The consent of the subject must be more than 
informed; It must i�ue from one who is capable of digesting the needed 
information and of directing his or her own conduct at a reasonably mature 
standard. If the potential subject is too young to appreciate the risks involved, or 
unable to understand the written account, or if the subject is too disordered in 
mind to make rational choices, consent wUI not be genuine even if it appears to 
issue from th&t incompetent person. 
40 5
Cohen: Moral Issues in Medical Experiementation on Humans
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1979
Moral Issues in Medical Experimentation on Humans 
Here enter questions both of legal competence and of moral competence. They 
greatly overlap, of course, since the legally incompetent are distinguished, as a class, 
mainly in order that persons who are morally incompetent (by reason of age or 
other cause) be the better protected. I attend here and below not to the law, but to 
the principles that should govern the formulation of the laws. 
(3) Voluntary consent. The consent of the subject must be more than informed 
and competent. It must be freely given. Of all the issues surrounding the principle 
of consent, this is perhaps the most tangled. Philosophers have been perennially 
concerned to underscore the importance of voluntariness in action, and perennially 
pained by the difficulties in drawing precisely the boundary line between the 
voluntary and the involuntary. 
There are, obviously, degrees of duress. At one extreme I may do of my own will 
what I must do to avoid great hurt or loss immediately threatened. I choose to hand 
over my wallet when the armed robber presents me with his alternatives: "Your 
money or your life!" At the other extreme I may do without any determination of 
will whatever (inhale, cough) what I would do gladly ·and voluntarily on request 
without duress of any kind. A moment's reflection is sufficient to realize that it is 
not easy to say precisely what coercion is, or when the line between the voluntary 
and the involuntary has been crossed. 
Yet we all have a pretty good feel for it. Potential subjects ought to have the 
power of choice protected insofar as circumstances permit. Whatever erodes or 
restricts that power and can be avoided ought to be avoided. Force or threats or 
pressure of any kind, designed to manipulate the subject's will, are to be 
scrupulously avoided. 
In the. concrete this means that the investigator seeking subjects for research 
must avoid all forms of manipulative behavior. He must not suggest that refusal to , 
cooperate will be penalized iri any way, nor must he, by the tone of his request, 
suggest that refusal is a selfish or otherwise immoral act. He must protect, so far as 
he is able, the potential subject's power of unmanipulated choice. 
Problems remain. Manipulation takes many forms, some of which are coercive, 
in being ultimately reducible to some threat of bad consequences if consent not be 
given. Whatever the particular content of the threat (refusal to treat, or to admit, or 
whatever) coercion must be completely foreswom. Its target is the very freedom 
that genuine consent supposes. Some manipulation, however, is more accurately 
viewed as enticement than as coercion. Not all rewards for participation are 
enticing; many will be no more than bare recompense for inconvenience or 
discomfort. Paying volunteers, therefore, is not nece�ly an undue enticement, 
nor are the other benefits that may accrue to the subject necessarily to be 
eliminated. Still, depending upon the circumstances of particular subjects, 
inducements may be so great as unfairly �o manipulate the subjects' wills. Very 
large sums of money to inveigle indigent persons into the assumption of great risks, 
for example, may be improperly manipulative even when not coercive in the strict 
sense. The term "coercio:n!' is often used to include the class of improper 
enticements, but is better restricted to manipulation grounded on threat. This 
terminological variation must not obscure the difference between the two classes, 
or their likenes.5. By threat, or by exces.5ive inducement, the voluntariness of 
consenfmay be eroded. Fairness requires that both be avoided. 
What cannot be avoided, however, are the differing circumstances of potential 
subjects. Some people are in circumstances in which participation as an 
experimental subject is attractive to a degree that it is not attrac tive to others. Sick 
people may be much more disposed to participate in an experiment--even a risky 
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one-aiming at a cure for their illness than those who do not suffer from that illness. 
Wealthy people may be less influenced by offers of small sums as compensation for 
inconvenience than are poor people. We cannot reasonably say that people--sick or 
poor or what.ever •. are coerced (or manipulated) by their conditions. All of us are in 
conditions making some choices more attractive and others less. If coercion be 
treated too loosely it swallows all conduct, whereupon voluntary consent becomes 
impossible for anyone--and the distinction between volunta:ry and involuntary 
consent for which we are seeking is unhappily obscured. 
Although the ways in which conduct may be manipulated are various, not 
everything that influences conduct manipulates it. Circumstances affecting the 
subject's choice for which the investigator has no responsibility are not to be taken 
as coercive just because they are influential. On the other hand, the exploitation of 
persons in specially delicate circumst.ances may be unfair. When, if ever, is an offer 
in i�elf exploitative? I will return to this question, giving a partial answer, in 
Chapter IV, below. 
These, then, are the three essential elements of full consent: information, 
competence, and voluntariness. By safeguarding them we apply the principle of 
consent in such a way . as to give to potential subjects the protections they are 
universa1ly entitled to. 
CHAPTER III: FORBIDDING EXCESSIVELY RISKY EXPERIMENTS 
The protection of human subjects must go beyond those absolute protections 
flowing from the principle of consent. Protections of another sort--"relative" or 
"institutional" might be the terms used to identify them--are also called for. T<>°see 
that this is true we need only observe that not every proposed experimenl involving 
human subjects ought to be undertaken. While the presumption of freedom of 
inquiry for the professional medical investigator is a weighty one, we are all lik�ly 
to agree tha.t, even where the consent of the subjects could be garnered, some 
experiments on humans should not be performed at all. Why not? Which 
experiments are rightly forbidden, and why? 
Of all the terrain being charted in this paper, this is the portion least well 
explored to date. That there lies a duty on the part of those who would conduct 
research to constrain that conduct within certain moral bounds, to apply to any 
proposed research moral principles of general force, is universaJly agreed. But there 
is little agreement upon the content of such principles, or upon their grounds. In 
what follows I make an attempt to mark out general features of the constraint.5 
rightly applied. 
Here, as in seeking the foundation of the principle of consent in Chapt.er I,  the 
thrust is both utilitarian and deontological--looking to consequences and to 
antecedent right. But in this sphere differing principles resulting from the two 
foundations differ widely in content. They may conflict at times, but even when 
they do not they have very different targets. 
On the utilitarian side the general aim is easy to formulate, but not always easy 
to achieve. It is to calculate the risks and the benefits of the experiment proposed, 
and to permit or restrict in the light of that calcu�ation. Of course such calculations 
cannot, at the time of the research proposal, be made with precision, involving as 
they do judgments of merit and demerit that ma.y be controversial, a:nd depending 
as they do upon estimates of probabilities that are unavoidably crude. The resulting 
porous character of the concept of a "risk-benefit balance" ought not be forgotten, 
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but neither should it be overblown. Impossible tlhough it may be to quantify the 
elements in such a calculation, it remains possible for reasonable persons to reach 
defensible utilitarian evaluations of particular experiments in the vast majority of 
cases. The evils of discomfort or minor risk for ·a few (always supposing their full 
consent) may be clearly outweighed by the good of the knowledge anticipated, and 
the weighing, in most cases, never even needs to be thought of in quantitative 
terins. Where the value of the expected goods declines, or their likelihood 
diminishes, while the magnitude of the risks required to seek it increases, or their 
likelihood increases, the tasks of calculation become more troubling. Sometimes 
our data are insufficient to. make any reliable estimates of the probabilities of the 
several possible outcomes--whereupon the task of calculation becomes agonizing. 
Yet that task must be performed if the moral judgment is to be made. And in 
fact we do perform it, individually or institutionally. We make the needed 
judgments as best we can, weighing good oranges against bad apples, and using 
subjective estimates of probabilities where the quantitative data are unobtain�ble. 
We cannot avoid making the requisite utilitarian calculations. If we propose to 
bypass them we do no mo� than allow the decision to ride upon other hidden 
consequentialist considerations··cost, convenience,· personal preference of the 
investigators, or the like. At some point the moral agent whose conduct involves the 
well-being of others must ask himself or be asked whether the experiment is worth 
doing. Requiring that considerations of risk and benefit enter the. resolution of that 
question is no more than a demand for a fully rational treatment of the issue, a· 
demand that all relevant factors be considered. The experiment will be forbidden or 
it will not be. In coming to that decision we must do the best we can. 
Because medical experimentation usually has an institutional setting--taking 
place in a. hospital, a research center, etc.--the task of imposing any needed 
restraints nonnally falls to some institutional authority. The bodies that make such 
determinations presently--institutional review boards (IRB) �s their generic 
name--make moral judgments that represent the institutions within which the 
experiments are proposed. Restricting the inquiry of its members is a distast.eful, 
but occasionally an essential institutional task. A good deal of attention has 
recen�ly been given to these institutional .review boards, their makeup, procedures, 
and powers. Tpe underlying principles upon which these reviewing bodies act, 
however, present a moral (as distinct from an administrative) problem. Even if there 
were no such institutional bodies (and only two decades ago there were virtually 
none) the same moral issues would be faced by individual researchers. 
Two conceptual distinctions make the task of utilitarian calculation somewhat 
more manageable--or at least put its difficulties into clearer relief. The first, very 
commonly employed, is the distinction between what are called therapeutic and 
non-therapeutic experiments. The point of this distinction is easy to see, even if a 
given experiment may occasionally be hard to place with respect to it. The aim of a 
medical experiment is commonly to devise or improve means for the treatment of 
some known disease. To test the efficacy of the newly proposed drug (or 
instrument, or procedure, etc.) tests are often run among populations of subjects 
suffering from that disease. If the means experimented with are indeed more 
efficacious than previously used therapies, some of the subjects in that experiment 
may themselves benefit from the try. Such experimentation is caJled therapeutic'. 
The same experiment may be using populations of healthy normal subjects as 
controls, and since no therapeutic advantage can be anticipated for them, it may, 
with respect to them, be viewed as non-therapeutic. -Many experiments are entirely 
non-therapeutic. There are middling cases, too, as when the subject population is 
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suffering from a disease whose ultimate elimination is the object of the experiment, 
although the experiment itself cannot yield direct therapeutic benefit to any of its 
subjects: All this has to be sorted in practice. What needs recognition here is that 
the utilitarian calculations must weigh the possible therapeutic advantages to the 
subject, as well as the absence of such advantages where they are absent. Where 
placebo controls.are used, in blind or double-blind experiments, it is the possibility 
of such therapeutic advantage for some that must be weighed. 
The entry of therapeutic considerations can alter the appraisal of risk-benefit 
balance dramatically In some circumstances. When the subject population is very, 
very sick--near death or afflicted wit� terrible pain-,the probabilities of success that 
will justify the use of drugs or procedures known to be risky will be 
proportionately lower; or, given the known likelihood of unpleasant by-product, 
the seriousness of that unpleasantness may be proportionately greater. The general 
form of the calculation is a balancing of the sum of the negative outcomes 
surmised, each multiplied by the estimated probability (objectively or subjectively 
determined) of its occurrence, against the sum of positive outcomes anticipated, 
similarly discounted. Where the subjects are in dire straights, and all other 
treatments of their illness have proved ineffective , even temporary remission of the 
disease may loom .so large as a factor on the plus side that negative factors 
intolerable in experiments with other populations are in these cases outweighed. 
A second distinction--also much used, but seldom well formulated··is that 
between two different kinds of obligation owed by the research investigators. We 
are seeking grounds· for a moral judgment; the fulfillment of moral obligations by 
the investigators counts heavily in making the needed judgment. To whom are 
obligations owed by them, and with what weight? They are owed, I submit, to 
parties in at least two different kinds of circumstances. [I omit here consideration 
of obligations that may be owed to the funding agency, the home institution> etc., 
as being of lesser, although not trivial concern.] Obligations are owed to the actual 
human beings who serve as subjects in the experiment at hand. We know who they 
are, can (usually) have discourse with them, and can make a pretty accurate 
estimate of whether they are being treated fairly. Obligations are also 
owed--perhaps by all persons, but certainly by the physician-researcher--to those 
many persons who now suffer or will suffer from a disease that it is the researcher's 
profession to help cure. Persons in this category are (for the most part) not now 
identifiable. We may not be able to name -them or speak to them; we are not sure 
how we will relate to them; yet they, too, must be treated fairly. 
The contrast here is that between what Kant called "perfect" and "imperfect" 
duties. If I borrow a book from a friend promising to return it the next day, I have 
a perfect duty--a known and circumscribed obligation to perform a specific act 
(returning the book) with respect to a specific, known person (its owner). But I 
have duties also--imperfect ones--to protect the rights of my t'ellow citizens, to aid 
the injured and comfort the sick. To fulfill such duties I must act in ways that 
cannot be clearly specified in advance, and which therefore depend upon my 
circumstances and unknown future relations with other persons. Much of the 
tension in calculating the risk-benefit balance of a proposed experiment in close 
cases is the pull between perfect duties of a certain ki 1d, owed to the known 
subjects, and imperfect duties of an uncertain kind, owed to unknown future 
patients. One who does not himself feel the duties taken on by the 
physician-researcher may more readily identify himself with the actual subject of 
the experiment, whose identity and circumstances are vividly known, and may 
come thereby to place t;oo much emphasis upon the perfect duties of the 
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investigator, to the pain of distant others. The research scientist, driven 
professionally as well as personally to seek therapeutic means of general and 
long-term usefulness, may be tempted to place too much emphasis upon the 
imperfect duties of the investigator, to the pain of an immediate few. 
There is no algorithm to resolve this conflict. Its unavoidability is a good reason 
to have the needed moral judgments reached through the deliberation of bodies on 
which both tendencies are represented. Recognizing the tension is far from enough 
to insure its wise resolution. But failing to recognize it is an invitation to utilitarian 
miscalculation. 
Thus far I have been speaking (in connection with the moral judgments going 
beyond .the matter of consent) only of the utilitarian calculations of risk and 
benefit by the researcher or the institution. Some constraints.introduced, however, 
appeal not to consequences but to fairness or rightness. 
These qeontological constraints enter at a different level from those based on 
risk-benefit; they · are likely to be thought of as boundary considerations marking 
out the area within which utilitarian calculations may go on. In this respect they are 
like the principle of consent discussed above. But unlike the consent principles, 
these must be formulated not with regard for the particular potential subject as the 
moral end or bearer of right, but with regard to justice in society at large. Even 
supposin·g consent, (we now ask) are there not proposed experiments that ought to 
be forbidden because their aims or procedures are not morally acceptable? Some 
such there will be, but it will not prove easy to state the principles on which such 
judgments must be made. 
Two kinds of principles, I suggest, properly ·guide us in setting out the 
boundaries here. The first attends to the fairness with which the burden of risks is 
to be home; the second concerns the rightness of the purpose of the enterprise. I 
will say a little about both. 
(i) Equity. If the ad�ance of medical science entails some risks to some 
subjects, it is a demand of fairness (possibly a demand whose satisfaction reduces 
utility somewhat) that those risks be distributed in such a way that no group or 
groups within society be singled out for the carrying of the burden. The risks 
cannot be spread with perfect evenness, of course, but the precarious circumstances 
of some groups (identifiable by class or employment) render them vulnerable to an 
excessive shar·e of the load. Each subject in the group in question may indeed give 
full consent, yet the group may have been unjustly targeted. Examples of groups 
sometimes so exploited are students in and around a modem medical cent.er, and 
the in_digent sick in public institutions. 
Some cautions are in order here. It should not be supposed that because a group 
does in fact bear a numerically disproportionate share of the experimental risks that 
it has, ipso facto, been unfairly treated. Reasons o f  a scientific sort may account for 
the distribution; or reasons of a practical sort may convince a reasonable person 
that no fairer distribution of essential risks could be achieved. Unfairness must be 
guarded against; numerical disproportions do not in themselves provide reliable 
evidence of unfairness. On the other side, it should not be supposed that a group is 
treated unfairly only if there had been a malicious intention to burden them while 
protecting others. That intention would be unconscionable, of course; but even 
without any malice whatever there may be unfairness springing from careless 
inattention to inequity. Fairness in the feasible distribu tiori of risks must be 
thought of in material as well _as formal terms. That is, we must consider the moral 
quality of the concret.e result of any procedure for the selection of a subject pool, 
as well as of the moral quality of the intentions of those who propose and execut.e 
45 10




(2) Purpose. Wrongness of aim, as well as unfairness in risk distribution, is a 
proper consideration of the aeent, whether Individual or institution. Moral 
restrictions bearing upon purpose rarely ever occur to the Individual medical 
Investigator. Insofar as he pursues his inquiry in the spirit ot his protesslon he has, 
understandably, little reason to be troubled by such matters. But institutions do 
have reason for concern because their members occasionally misbehave, sometimes 
acting with wrongtul means. Experiments may be proposed.whose lareer purposes 
are inconsistent with the aim of the institution; or their ulterior motivation (usually 
financial) may be outweighing the central aims of the institution;. or the object of 
the experiment may be intrinsically immoral. It is silly to exaggerate the trequency 
with which s<:ientists are called upon to advance the development of instruments of 
destruction, or injury, or death--but neither can such circumstances be entirely 
Ignored. It is not my purpose to fonnulate the rules determining what are and what 
are not permitted objectives or research, but some observations wlll help to 
delineate the tasks of judgment here. 
First, some objectives may be defensible in large, yet Indefensible In a specific 
institutional setting. National interests may conceivably justify the development of 
anti-personnel weapons; but even if such weapons are justifi�ble, experiments aimed 
at increasing their mutilatory capacity would be unjustifiable in a university 
hospital. Individuals have obligations partly as a consequence of their conscious 
institutional commitments. What a citizen may rightly do in one institutional 
context he may rightly be forbidden to do in another. Second, some objectives may 
be morally Indefensible in every context. Within our lifetimes there have been 
national purposes, vigorously pursued, to which no person could contribute with 
moral honor. Governments, including our own, may sometimes be very wicked; 
individuals and institutions within them may--painfully··be morally qbli�ed to 
refuse cooperation in advancing evil ends. The judgments required in such 
circumstances are far from simple; I only observe here that there.are some moral 
boundaries within which utilitarian calculations properly transpire. The boundary 
judgments may have to be made by persons or committees different from those 
called upon to make the risk/benefit calculation--but that should not obscure the 
underlying need for moral judgments of both kinds. 
CHAPTER IV: SPECIAL THEORETICAL DIFFICULTIES 
Three moral con trove mes of particular delicacy are unavoidable where 
experimentation upon human subjects is reaulady undertaken. One may better 
understand why these controversies must arise, and what the kinds of 
considerations are th�t properly wel1ht in resolving them, by reflecting upon the 
conceptual map thus far drawn. The three essential component.a in the full consent 
of the human subject have been Identified: information. competence, and 
voluntariness. The three unavoidable problems I now address are those which arise 
when, for honorable reasons, we seek to pursue experiments on human subjects 
whose consent, for reasons plausible on their face, is deficient with respect to one 
or more of these components. Sometimes subjects are deliberately not given all the 
information they might reasonably want or need: the problem of deception. 
Sometimes subjects are simply not able to consent, and others are called upon to 
make the decision for them: the problem of third·party consent for children and 
others. Sometimes subjects are so vulnerable to manipulation that the voluntariness 
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of their consent is brought into question: the problem of coercion of prisoners and 
others. Brief remarks··again without the aim of presenting solutions··on· each of 
these three controversies are in order. 
(1) Deception. Some moral philosophers have taught that one ought never lie, 
whatever the circumstances. If that be thought too extreme a position, it will at 
least be agreed that there is a very strong, prima facie obllgatton not to lie, or 
otherwise deliberately deceive another. Like the principle of consent discussed in 
Chapter I, this principle could be defended on utilitarian grounds: deception is 
often exposed; the distrust engendered by its exposure is likely to have adverse 
effects on all parties directly involved, as well as upon the parties who might have 
benefited from research which (as a consequence of that distrustful atmosphere) 
never is carried through, and so on. The argument has merit, as in the earlier. case, 
but again it is doubtful whether, on such utilitarian grounds alone, the presumption 
against deception would be as strong as we commonly take it to be. 
Indeed, the principle of consent itself seems to carry truthfulness in its train. If 
we are committed to the view that no one should be subject to an experiment 
without having given his consent, we may conclude that such consent is possible 
only when a true and complete account has been given to the subject of what he is 
asked to subject himse1f to. Else he cannot be said to have consented to that. Here, 
precisely, lies the tension between the principle of consent, on the one hand, and 
the need of some investigators to hide from the subjects the aim of their enterprise 
of some critical element within it. For some inquiries do require deception for their 
practical success. Are the results sought by these inquiries ever worth the deception 
needed to obtain them? 
Degrees of deception should be distinguished. There is a moral difference 
between telling a potential subject an outright lie, and telling him or her less than 
the whole truth. All the facts cannot ever be related, so the decision as to which 
details (because they are inessential) may be left unreported must be a matter of 
judgment. But it is not hard to determine when that need for judgment approaches 
the point of deliberate deception. Without strong reasons to the contrary, we would 
insist that all be reported which, for an ordinary person, might reasonably be 
weighed in making the decision to serve or refrain from serving as subject. Although 
there are degrees of deception, we may (for present purposes) clump the deliberate 
refusal to reveal facts known to be critically relevant with outright lies; both would 
be morally wrong unless compelling moral reasons can be given in their support. 
We supposed, a while back, that the obligation not to deceive was prima facie. If 
it were absolute, in the Kantian spirit, there would be no need for further 
discussion, and indeed no remaining moral issue. But we mean, by prima facie,  that 
such obligations may be overridden by other obligations. Our moral situation, after 
all, is rarely so simple as to have but one component pressing in but one direction. 
If the components are several, the. duty resulting from their integration and 
balancing may be to do what, in the abstract,. we have a strong prima facie 
obligation not to do. 
So it is here. May there be reasons to deceive strong enough to outweigh the 
obligation not to do so? There seems to be no way to reply to this question without 
weighing the object of the proposed inquiry, determining those whom it will serve, 
and how it will serve them, and what our obligations are to the beneficiaries of that 
deceit. Two comments may illuminate that weighing somewhat: 
(a) The reasons supporting deceit--if the case is to be made successfully··must be 
moral reasons, as distinct from merely technical ones. It Is undoubtedly true that, 
especially in some psychological investigations, the truthful telling to a subject of 
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the nature of the results sought in experimenting on him renders it impossible to 
get those results. For some experiments, deceived subjects are essential because 
knowing the aim of the inquiry must distort the subjects' responses within it. By 
itself, however, this fact does not serve as justification for the deception 
entertained. For that justification (if there is one) we need to hear the reasons those 
results are wanted. The quest must have a substantial moral dimension. 
What might serve? Consider the following hypothetical case. Suppose, to test the 
comparative efficacy of three pain relieving drugs, one of which is quite new, it is 
essential to deceive the experimental subjects, all of whom are told that, for their 
post-opera�ve pain, they will receive "pain-killers"--but are not told that they are 
being used as subjects in which their reactions under the influence of the differing 
substances will be very carefully monitored and compared . Suppose that this 
deception is introduced only because it is essential to dete�ine the true impact of 
the substances being tested, and because the slightest suspicion that one is an 
experimental subject is likely to distort his responses to pain. Suppose also that the 
greater efficacy of newly developed pain-relievers is truly sought in the interest of 
the comfort and hel!ling of very many future patients. Is deception, in itself 
innocuous yet knowing and deliberate, justified in such a case? Any answer depends 
upon the resolution of the tension between obligations owed to the experimental 
subjects and obligations owed to future patients--duties perfect and imperfect. 
(b) The need to weigh the obligation owed to the potential beneficaries of the 
experiment points to a critical difference between deception in this context and 
deception in the normal therapeutic context, where the 'half-truth or the lie is used 
by the physician in what he honestly believes to be the good of the patient for 
which he, the therapist, is in part responsible. Treating reports as though they were 
a kind of medicine, he administers them in quantities, and at times, calculat.ed to 
advance the patient's welfare. In such contexts also the component obligations may 
be multiple, but insofar as they all bear upon the well-being of the same moral 
claimant, the patient, those components may be the more readily integrated. 
(2) Third-party consent. Complications in this sphere are many; I mention only 
some of them. If we begin with the premise that some experiments involving 
children and other persons incompetent to give consent are absolutely essential 
(because some experiments involving such subjects must be pursued for moral 
reasons--to make the better care of children possible) we are obliged to allow that, 
for some such persons, third-party consent will suffice. That only sets the problem, 
however. We cannot suppose that wherever subjects are used for whom third-party 
consent would be required, the fact of that requirement is itself the guarantor of 
the moral authority of the (most appropriate) third.party. What authority third 
parties have is a delicate question. Aside from all legal issues, we must consider two 
kinds of limitations that might restrict such moral authority. 
The first kind flows from the moral role of the third parties. Do they serve as 
proxy for the incompetent? That is, do they properly make the decision (to 
participate or decline) as they suppose that incompetent would decide were he or 
she able to deal with the request made? Or do third parties serve as moral guardians. 
making the decision appropriate for one in the circumstances of that incompetent, 
without needing to determine what, in fact, that person's judgment would have 
been if it were feasible to obtain? The distinction here is important. For one who 
decides on behalf of an adult who is temporarily incompetent, it seems proper to 
do so within the limitation of inclinations or wishes expressed by that incompetent 
during earlier periods of competence. Here the role of proxy is supposed. When, 
however, the incompetent is a child of very tender years, the child's irrational fears 
48 13
Cohen: Moral Issues in Medical Experiementation on Humans
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1979
Moral Issues in Medical Experimentation on Humans 
of very minor hurts may be properly overridden. Infants can hardly be said to have 
any clear inclinations in such matters. Here the role or moral guardian--making the 
judgment that one who is competent ought to make, all things considered--is 
supposed. 
If we grant, arguendo, the, role of moral guardian to third parties in at least some 
circumstances, we do not justify the inference that they therefore have absolute 
discretion in the affair. The corpus of that incompetent--infant or other--is not 
theirs to dispose of without principled restrictions. What restrictions? What 
constraints must third-party moral guardians act within? This philosophical thicket 
needs further exploration. To appreciate some of the difficulties, consider one 
constraining principle that has been proposed: that third parties may give consent 
for incompetent.s under their guardianship when the experiment in view is 
therapeutic (i.e., where there is potential benefit for the incompetent subject) and 
the possible benefit at least balances the risks incurred, but [this principle 
continues] consent may not be given for experiments upon the iricompetent of a 
non-therapeutic kind. The argument in support of this principle goe"S like this: In ( 
non-therapeutic experiments the risks, however minor, cannot be balanced by 
benefits, and it is not within the moral authority of any third-party to be altruistic 
with the corpus of another human being, even his or her own child. Plausible 
though this principle (and its defense) may seem, it would in fact prove intolerably 
restrictive, rendering impossible the conduct of many vital experiments requiring 
the use of healthy normal children as controls. The proposed principle would have 
the effect, therefore, of putting children in general in an even more disadvantageous 
position that they now are with respect to the availability of promising 
pharmaceuticals and other new therapies. The proper constraints upon third-party 
moral guardians, I conclude, require a great deal more deliberation. 
All this is with respect to limitations arising from the role of the third-party. A 
second kind of moral limitation arises from the expressed desires of potential 
subjects who, although incompetent, may yet be mature enough or sane enough to 
express clear preference. Eight-year-olds, twelve-year-olds, surely fifteen-year-olds, 
may have strong and rational views about their participation in some 
experiment--objecting to it perhaps, or favoring it strongly. How is that voice to be 
weighed? One plausible view is this: that the child's desire to participate (his 
"assent" as distinguished from "consent") not be permitted to override the moral 
guardian's veto, but that the child's refusal to give assent be weighed heavily, if not 
dispositively, should it conflict with the affirmative judgment of the guardian. How 
heavily that refusal should then weigh is not easy to say in general; we would need 
guidelines respecting age (say, that the participation of a subject fourteen years of 
age or over will not normally be allowed without the subject's assent, in addition to 
the moral guardian's consent); guidelines respecting the seriousness of risk (say, that 
the refusal of assent be weighed more heavily as the risks of the proposed 
experiment are the greater); and guidelines respecting the therapeutic potentiality 
of the experiment (say, that the refusal of assent be weighed the less seriously as 
the potential therapeutic benefits of the experiment are the greater). These are no 
more than exploratory suggestions, efforts to chart a territory so far largely 
uncharted. Such guidelines require moral substantiation, of course. 
A final complication regarding the moral status of children as research subjects 
deserves remark. Some argue that in experi.menting upon children the central 
ethical concerns are not the rights of the child, but the obligations of the parents. 
On this view the parents have heavy duties of care for the child which include the 
duty to see to its proper education and healthy growth of character. They are 
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obliged, therefore, to protect the child, and also to introduce it to the world of 
'participation in ·common and mutually supportive enterprise. What constrains the 
third parties, on this account, is not to be viewed as flowing from a putative ciaim 
of the incompetent, but as flowing from the assumption of parental duties, where 
the proper fulfillment of those duties requires the integration of conflicting 
demands. 
(3) Coercion. Whenever prisoners or other precariously placed persons are the 
potential subjects, we may ask whether that precariousness renders genuine consent 
impOlisible, I have discussed the many complications in this region of our territory 
at substantial length elsewhere. [See, C. Cohen, ''Medical Experimentation on 
Prisoners," Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Vol. 21, No. 3, Spring, 1978.] It 
will therefore· be sufficient to recapitulate, without entering the argument, the 
conclusions reached there. 
Coereion is a concept p1hilosophically complex; the word itself is often used 
loosely and with different senses, as I have shown in Chapter II, above. I contend 
that the sense in which prisoners (or servicemen on active military duty, or students 
in classes, or employees of drug companies, or indigent patients in public clinics) 
are unavoidably exposed to coercion is not the same sense of coercion in which, if 
it were present, their consent would be vitiated. In sum, the looser sense of the 
term-in which sense we are all "coerced" by our circumstances, by the perils or 
boredom of an uncooperative environment--is often unhappily confounded with the 
narrower, more critical sense, in which one_ is coerced when one is subjected to 
deliberate threat by others. Consent that is coerced in that narrower sense, or that 
is othef\\'.'ise the product of manipulation by deceit or improper enticement, is. not 
truly voluntary. To be sure, manipulation is easier when the pool of potential 
subjects is vulnerable as students or prisoners are. But it is simply a mistake (I refer 
my readers to the full defense of this conclusion in the essay mentioned.above) to 
suppose that persons so precariously placed are incapable of giving volunary 
consent. Prisone�, indigents, and others need special protection because of their 
vulnerability; they do not need to be patronized. 
· I contend, further, that to suppose such populations incapable of giving consent 
is not to protect them, but seriously to damage them by refusing them a measure of 
moral autonomy to which they are, as human beings, morally entitled. Moreover, 
the moral value of the results of experiments in which prisoners serve as ideal 
subjects (because of the possibility of the control of experimental conditions over 
prolonged periods) is exceedingly great. That value must also be weighed in 
determining the rightness of a rule that would forbid the use of prison (or other) 
populations. But all of this is territory that has been explored; I leave the reader to 
refer to those other (I think reliable) charts. 
This completes what I shall say here about the special theoretical controversies 
arising in connection with consent--those pertaining to deception, incompetence, 
and coercion. 
Whatever moral principles are proposed in this sphere, they must face difficulties 
in application and enforcement. These are chiefly administrative, not philosophical 
problems; but one practical addendum, promised at the outset, has a philosophical 
edge. It is this. The realities of medical investigations, the special moral relations 
between doctors and their patients and between researchers and! their subjects, are 
such that no guiding principles can be expected to.receive respect in practice unless 
their rightness wins the rational assent of at least a substantial majority of the 
scientists expected to act upon them. Efforts to police principles that cannot be 
effectively defended on moral grounds must fail in the long run, and will be Jikely 
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to alienate many scientists, thereby seriously interfering with the appropriate 
introduction of moral concerns into the experimental enterprise. I conclude that 
our principles in this sphere must not only be right, but that our arguments In their 
behalf must be cogent and persuasive. Only with that foundation can the needed 
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